On 10 July 2017, a Marine KC-130T Hercules crashed in rural Mississippi during a training flight from Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina. All 16 servicemembers on board were killed. The Navy and Marine Corps stopped flying their C-130Ts immediately and grounded them officially on 1 September 2017. The subsequent investigation revealed the accident’s cause––a corroded propeller that had been released by an Air Force repair facility and accepted by the Marine Corps without proper inspection––and concluded that other Navy C-130 propellers were likely to be faulty. Therefore, each aircraft needed four new defect-free propellers before it could get back in the air. The replacement process went forward, but by April 2019, nearly two years after the tragedy in Mississippi, only six of the Navy’s 24 C-130Ts were operational.
Which begs the question: Are these maintenance-intensive aircraft worth the extensive resources they use and the potential hazard they pose to aircrews?
The C-130T Is Dispensable
Should the Navy and Marine Corps transition as much as possible to the C-40 Clipper for logistics transport? The C-40, a military version of the Boeing 737-700C airline transport, was designed for passenger movement (A-rig), but it can be configured to move a combination of passengers and cargo (B-rig) or six standard cargo pallets only (C-rig). Currently, C-40s are commonly used in both the A-rig and B-rig configurations but require the parent air wing’s permission for C-rig flights. The Hercules, on the other hand, was never meant to be an airliner. Although the Navy now uses it solely to carry passengers and cargo, it was designed around its powerful turbofan engines and propeller system for short takeoff/landing capability and has served in all manner of roles: paratroop and cargo air dropper, tactical air-to-air refueler, hurricane hunter, even heavy gunship.
One rationale for reducing the number of Navy C-130s to a minimum––perhaps just enough to handle cargos the C-40s cannot––is evident in the way the fleet found alternative logistical solutions while most of its C-130s were grounded awaiting replacement propellers. After the 2017 crash, the Navy Air Logistics Office (NALO) quickly devised innovative ways to shift most of the logistical burden onto the five Navy C-40 squadrons. C-40 flight time was increased substantially, and squadron crews were agile in rerigging aircraft from all- or partial-passenger configurations to one capable of handling limited palletized cargo. Even today, as more C-130s become available, C-40s still shoulder 70 percent of NALO tasking because of improved capability and reliability.
The Navy and Marine Corps found other ways to satisfy movement requirements, such as the use of commercial carriers, a solution that sometimes proved more cost efficient than using service assets. Units also relied on local asset allocations, purchasing supplies or trucking cargo when available, eliminating the transportation cost associated with logistical movements across the continental United States and around the world. Specialized units that had relied solely on the Hercules for equipment transportation, such as the Navy Fleet Survey Team, found scheduling solutions with the Air Force Air Mobility Command.
Too Costly to Fly and Maintain
The legacy C-130T presents an ongoing maintenance challenge that greatly reduces aircraft availability and the ability to satisfy logistical tasking. C-130Ts are one of military’s most maintenance-intensive assets, requiring more than 100 maintenance hours per flight hour. Moreover, the way parts are made available for maintenance actions is an inefficient process that further inhibits timely maintenance. With the aircraft now in the twilight of its life, parts are no longer mass produced or readily available, with most needing to be individually ordered with a longer than normal delivery time. The consequences are obvious: regular delays. C-40s, benefiting from civilian sources of parts for the commercial Boeing 737, offer greater reliability and consistency.
The Navy C-130 program is a prime example of a cost-intensive program that should be scaled back or terminated as quickly as possible. According to a 2018 Congressional Budget Office study on the operating costs of aging airframes, the cost of operating the Air Force C-130H model increases by 7 percent per year when it reaches the age of 25.1 The Navy’s C-130s, introduced between July 1991 and December 1996, are now in that age bracket. Also, according to NALO, the C-130’s average cost per flight hour is much greater at $6,272 than that of the C-40 at $3,918.2 The Hercules is also slower—meaning longer missions, longer flight legs, more flight hours to reach the same location, more remain-overnight (RON) stops, and higher per diem costs for C-130T crews. A C-40 departing NAS Fort Worth can reach the western Pacific in two days, flying approximately 19 hours with one RON stop and two fuel stops. A C-130 would take approximately 33 flight hours and need at least three RON stops with the possibility of a third fuel stop.
Other numbers illustrate the bottom line. From 1 October 2018 to 2 April 2019, across all theaters, C-40s were tasked with 563 missions, flying 6,917 hours and moving 44,500 passengers and 5.4 million pounds of cargo. Using NALO reporting metrics, the cost to the military of these logistical operations was approximately $23.5 million, compared with $27.5 million to accomplish them commercially. In that same timeframe, C-130s were tasked with 242 missions, flying 3,170 flight hours to move 2,249 passengers and 5.3 million pounds of cargo at a cost of $22 million versus an estimated commercial charge of $9.7 million. It is true that a C-130 can move cargo a C-40 cannot—wheeled vehicles and large shipping containers being non-belly-loadable—but the economics of efficiency speak for themselves.
Reduce the C-130T Fleet
Currently, the Navy has 24 C-130Ts spread across five squadrons, with about one in four aircraft available for tasking at any one time. Consolidating down to two squadrons, one on each U.S. coast, each with six aircraft, could be achieved while still supporting the geographic combatant commanders. One C-130T each could still be dedicated to European, Central, Pacific, and Africa commands, with both squadrons also able to send aircraft detachments forward periodically when they are not at home undergoing phased maintenance and inspections. A 50 percent reduction in aircraft would relieve the demand for parts and concentrate maintenance efforts on fewer aircraft, significantly reducing cost and manpower needs.
On the maintenance and manpower front, a significant change is needed. Currently, maintainers are encouraged to change aircraft platforms each tour to facilitate a well-rounded career, but after the Navy experienced an 82 percent increase in aviation mishaps across all aircraft platforms from 2013 to 2017 (a spike noted as “the military’s worst” by Military Times), an investigation found a correlation between mishaps and a lack of experienced maintainers.3 It seems clear that enlisted maintenance personnel should remain with Hercules squadrons for multiple tours or even the bulk of a career. C-130T expertise must be maintained as long as the aircraft still flies.
Reducing the number of aging Navy C-130Ts would allow money saved to be reinvested in the C-40s, ensuring their ability to shoulder most Navy and Marine Corps logistical demands even as their fleet also ages. Furthermore, approval authority to schedule the C-40 as an all-cargo C-rig should be lowered from the air wing to the platform scheduling agency.
The loss of 16 service members was tragic and preventable. But the resulting stand down taught the naval aviation logistics community it could manage with fewer C-130Ts. Scaling back and consolidating the Hercules squadrons would mean better use of Navy resources. It might even save lives.
1. Congressional Budget Office, “Operating Costs of Aging Air Force Aircraft,” September 2018, 5.
2. Office of the Comptroller of the United States, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Department of Defense (DOD) Fixed Wing and Helicopter Reimbursement Rates,” 12 October 2018.
3. Sara Copp, “Navy’s Spike in Aviation Mishaps Is the Military’s Worst, Up 82%,” Military Times,
8 April 2018.